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TYSON FOODS, INC. V.
BOUAPHAKEO: THE USE OF
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN CLASS
ACTIONS
WENBO ZHANG*
INTRODUCTION
Statistical methods have always played an important role in
1
litigation. The importance of statistical analysis is particularly
apparent in class-action lawsuits because the aggregation of individual
2
claims allows more data collection and information gathering.
Crippling the use of statistical evidence in litigation could have wide
implications in various legal contexts, including calculating damages
in wrongful death cases, using DNA evidence in criminal prosecutions,
and determining liability in pharmaceutical products, antitrust, and
3
discrimination cases. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has largely
foreclosed arguments for trial by statistics in Wal-Mart Stores v.
4
Dukes.
The Court’s decision in Dukes does not, and should not, however,
indicate the demise of statistical sampling in class-action lawsuits.
Many courts have expressed their support for the use of statistics in
5
class action cases post-Dukes. In particular, most courts have refused

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017.
1. Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J.
227, 228 (2012); Brief of Economists and Other Social Scientists As Amici Curiae In Support of
Respondents at 8, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2015).
2. Id. at 9–10.
3. Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors In Support of Respondents at 10–11,
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2015).
4. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ method of proving class-wide sex
discrimination by relying on an extrapolation of results from a sample of the class).
5. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2014)
(observing that Dukes “does not prohibit certification based on the use of extrapolation to
calculate damages”); Balasanyan v. Nordstrom, Inc., 294 F.R.D. 550, 572 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
(permitting the use of a survey to establish damages after Dukes); Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No.
ED CV 11-1600 PSG (SPx), 2013 WL 146323, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (finding Dukes
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to adopt much of the rationale of Dukes in cases under the Fair Labor
6
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), and wage-and-hour cases where
company-wide compensation policies, rather than the subjective
7
intent of managers, are scrutinized. Importantly, in cases where the
employer violates its timekeeping duty under the FLSA, the long8
standing rule of Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. preserves the
employees’ right to use inferential evidence based on relevant
statistics to establish class-wide proof.
It follows that Mt. Clemens, rather than Dukes, should be the
9
controlling precedent for Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo. In Tyson
Foods, employees of one of Tyson’s meat-processing facilities sued
their employer for failure to pay overtime compensation required
under both federal and state labor law. And like the employer in Mt.
Clemens, Tyson violated (for purposes of class certification) the FLSA
recordkeeping requirements, which mandate that the employer keep
accurate records of the employees’ working hours. The Supreme
Court is asked to address the important issue of whether certification
was proper where plaintiffs used representative evidence to prove the
10
amount of work they did, in accordance with Mt. Clemens.
This commentary first describes the factual and legal backgrounds
of Tyson Foods in Parts I and II respectively, and then explains the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Bouaphakeo v. Tyson

to be inapplicable when the calculation of wage-and-hour penalties did not require
individualized determinations).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Morris v. Affinity Health Plan, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Smith v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 09-cv-01632-CMA-BNB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56987, at *15 (D.
Colo. Apr. 21, 2012); Robinson v. Ryla Teleserv., Inc., No. CA 11-131-KD-C, 2011 WL 6667338,
at *3–4 (S.D. Ala., Dec. 21, 2011); Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Dist., No. C 08-05186, 2011
WL 5242977 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011); Ware v. TMobile USA, No. 3:11-cv-411, 2011 WL
5244396, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011); Troy v. Kehe Food Distrib., Inc., No. C09-0785JLR,
2011 WL 4480172, *14 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2011); Faust v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt.,
No. WMN-10-2336, 2011 WL 5244421, at *1 n.1. (D. Md. Nov. 1, 2011); Sliger v. Prospect Mort.,
No. Civ. S-11-465 LKK/EFB, 2011 WL 3747947, at *2 n.25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). But see
Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n., Nos. A125557 & A126827, 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 107 (Cal.
App. Feb. 6, 2012), modified and reh’g denied, Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2012 Cal. App.
LEXIS 265 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Mar. 6, 2012).
8. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
9. No. 14-1146 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2015).
10. See Brief of Petitioner at i, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo No. 14-1146 (U.S. Aug. 7,
2015) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner]. The Court has also been asked to address a second issue:
whether certification was proper when some class members may not have been injured. See id.
This Commentary, however, focuses only on the issue of the use of representative evidence.
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11

Foods, Inc. in Part III. Part IV presents both parties’ arguments.
Finally, Part V examines the validity of the plaintiffs’ use of statistical
evidence to estimate class-wide liability and damages, and argues that
the Supreme Court should allow the plaintiffs to use this type of
representative evidence to support class certification.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
12

Tyson operates a pork-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa.
The facility requires all employees to wear certain items of personal
13
protective equipment (PPE), which is stored in lockers at the facility.
Production employees are required to clean and put on the required
PPE before they start working on the production line, and they
14
generally do so in the locker rooms. Tyson pays its production
employees on a “gang time” system, which only records the time
workers spend at the production line when the production line is
15
moving.
Besides “gang time,” Tyson also pays some of its employees for a
few additional minutes per day—known as “K-code” time—to
compensate them for donning, doffing, and washing specialized
16
protective equipment. Prior to 2007, Tyson paid four minutes of Kcode time to each employee in a department where knives were
17
used. From February 2007 to June 2010, Tyson limited K-code
payment to only knife-wielding employees but raised the K-code time
to between four and eight minutes per day, to account for both
walking between the locker room and the production line, and
18
donning and doffing. Tyson never recorded the actual amount of
19
time workers spent donning, doffing, rinsing, or walking.
A group of current and former production employees at the
Storm Lake facility filed suit against Tyson in 2007, alleging that the

11. Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct.
2806 (2015).
12. Joint Appendix at 28, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Aug. 7,
2015) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
13. Id. at 36.
14. Id. at 37.
15. Brief for Respondents at 7, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Sept.
22, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
16. Joint Appendix, supra note 12, at 186.
17. Id. at 121–22.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 175.
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company undercompensated them for their overtime donning and
doffing work in violation of the FLSA and the Iowa Wage Payment
20
Collection Law (“IWPCL”). The Northern District of Iowa certified
a class action and conditionally certified a collective action based on
21
Rule 23 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), respectively. In doing so, the court
found that there were “far more factual similarities than
dissimilarities” among the class and collective action members and
that questions common to the class predominated over individualized
22
questions. A total of 444 employees joined the collective action; the
23
parallel class action had 3,344 plaintiffs.
In the ensuing jury trial, the plaintiffs presented employee
testimony, video recordings of donning and doffing at the facility, and
24
an expert-run study based on 744 videotaped observations. In the
study, the expert estimated that donning, doffing, and related activities
required 21.25 minutes per day for employees in the slaughter
department and 18 minutes per day for employees in the processing
25
department. From these estimates, another expert calculated the
amount of uncompensated overtime for each individual plaintiff and
tallied a total of approximately $6.7 million in unpaid overtime for the
26
entire class. At Tyson’s request, the jury instructions stated, “any
employee who has already received full compensation for all activities
you may find to be compensable is not entitled to recover any
27
damages.” The court also heeded Tyson’s proposed verdict form
28
calling for the jury to provide a single total damages award.
The jury found that the time the employees spent donning and
doffing their PPE was compensable work “integral and indispensible”
to the employees’ gang-time work and not “de minimis,” but that
29
donning and doffing during meal breaks was not compensable. It

20. Id. at 28, 39–40.
21. Id. at 117.
22. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25, Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for the United
States].
23. Joint Appendix, supra note 12, at 117.
24. Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135
S. Ct. 2806 (2015).
25. Joint Appendix, supra note 12, at 123–24.
26. Id. at 139, 465–66.
27. Id. at 101.
28. Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 20.
29. Joint Appendix, supra note 12, at 486–87.
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awarded roughly $2.9 million in damages to the plaintiffs. Tyson
31
appealed and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
damages class action which satisfies Rule 23(a)’s requirements may be
certified if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
32
controversy.”
The FLSA establishes both a minimum wage requirement and an
overtime compensation requirement at a rate of one and one-half
times an employee’s regular wage for work exceeding forty hours in a
33
workweek. It allows “any one or more employees” to bring a
“collective action” to recover unpaid wages “for and on behalf of
34
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.”
For FLSA collective action certifications, most jurisdictions have
adopted a two-step approach in determining whether plaintiffs are
35
“similarly situated.” For conditional certification at the initial “notice
stage,” the “similarly situated” requirement is met when there are
“substantial allegations that the putative class members were together
36
the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” If conditional
certification is granted, prospective class members can then opt into
37
the lawsuit. At the second step of certification, courts review the
38
“similarly situated” question again using a stricter standard. Factors
courts consider include “(1) disparate factual and employment
settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available
to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; [and] (3)

30. Id. at 488.
31. Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 22.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
34. Id.
35. Daniel C. Lopez, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class
Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 288 (2009); see Thiessen v. Gen.
Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001).
36. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 672,
678 (D. Colo. 1997)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1103.
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39

fairness and procedural considerations.” Once the collective action
proceeds to trial, the opt-in class members enjoy the same rights,
40
privileges, and benefits as the original plaintiff.
FLSA collective actions are “fundamentally different” from class
41
actions under Rule 23(b). First, the majority of the United States
appellate courts believe that the FLSA “similarly situated”
requirement is less stringent than Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
42
requirement. Second, unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which requires class
members to opt out if they do not wish to be included in a class, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA requires employees to opt into the
43
lawsuit by filing written consent to become “party plaintiff[s].” The
purpose of § 216(b) is to allow employees with common issues of law
and fact arising from the same violation to sue collectively, so as to
44
reduce individual costs and boost efficiency in the judicial system.
45
Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 to exclude some
of the activities that constitute work under the FLSA, such as
travelling to and from the location of the employee’s principal
activity, and activities that are “preliminary to or postliminary to said
46
principal activity.” The exceptions to such exclusions only apply to
those activities that are considered an “integral and indispensable
part of the principal activities” and are performed before the
commencement of an employee’s principal activities on any particular
47
workday. Such activities are compensable even when they are
performed “before or after the regular work shift, on or off the
48
production line.”
The FLSA also requires employers to keep “records of the
persons employed . . . and of the wages, hours, and other conditions
and practices of employment” according to regulations the Secretary

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013).
42. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1807
(3d ed. Supp. 2015); see, e.g., O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 585–86 (6th
Cir. 2009); Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 n.12 (11th Cir. 1996). But see
Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, 705 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2013).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
44. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012).
46. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 26–28 (2005).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).
48. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 29–30 (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956)).
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of Labor issued, including “[h]ours worked each workday[,] . . . total
50
hours worked each workweek,” and regular and overtime pay.
51
The Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL) is a
complementary wage-and-hour law paralleling the FLSA. It requires
employers to pay for all hours worked and to compensate for
52
53
overtime work. Like the FLSA, the IWPCL requires recordkeeping
54
and creates a private cause of action.
In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., the Supreme Court
addressed the problem that arises when “the employer’s records are
55
inaccurate or inadequate.” In that case, seven employees and their
labor union, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
brought a FLSA collective-action suit alleging that the employer’s
method of computing the total working time did not accurately reflect
the time they actually worked and that they were deprived of the
56
proper amount of overtime compensation. The Court rejected the
Sixth Circuit’s stringent standard of proof and held that the
employer’s “failure to keep proper records in conformity with [its]
statutory duty” calls for a burden-shifting framework that prevents
57
the employer from benefiting from its own mistake.
Under this framework, an employee first has to show that “he has
in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated”
and that he has “sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of
58
that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Then, the
burden shifts to the employer to provide evidence of the exact
amount of work performed or evidence to undermine the employee’s
59
evidence. Because the employer has received the benefits of the
employee’s work, even if the lack of accurate records was a bona fide
mistake, the employer still has to pay for the work “on the most
60
accurate basis possible under the circumstances.”

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2012).
29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(6)–(9) (2015).
IOWA CODE § 91A.1–A.14 (2015).
Id.
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 875-216.2(1)(g) (2015).
IOWA CODE § 91A.8.
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946).
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 687–88.
Id.
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In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, approximately 1.5 million current and
former female Wal-Mart employees filed a class-action lawsuit against
their employer, alleging systematic sex discrimination in violation of
61
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court ruled
that Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirement of commonality was not satisfied
62
and reversed class certification. The Court refused to allow the
plaintiffs to prove sex discrimination and the amount of backpay
63
owed by the method they proposed. This method involves first
determining the number of valid claims for a sample of the class, then
applying the percentage of valid claims to the entire class, and finally
multiplying that number “by the average backpay award in the
64
sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery.” This kind of “[t]rial
by [f]ormula,” the Court unanimously held, would violate the Rules
65
Enabling Act by depriving Wal-Mart of the right to litigate its
66
statutory defense to individual claims.
III. HOLDING
In Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court of
67
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to certify the class.
Like the district court, the court of appeals found that the differences
68
in the equipment worn by employees were inconsequential. The
court observed that because Tyson violated its statutory
recordkeeping obligations, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
allowed the plaintiffs to use representative proof to determine the
69
amount of individual unrecorded overtime. Moreover, the court
factually distinguished Wal-Mart v. Dukes and observed that the
present case did not present a “trial by formula” as suggested by
Tyson because the plaintiffs “prove[d] liability for the class as a whole,
70
using employee time records to establish individual damages.” The
court also reasoned that a class might be certified even if some class
members’ claims failed on the merits and therefore they could not

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2544 (2011).
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2544–46.
Id. at 2561.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 2014).
See id. at 797.
Id.
Id. at 797–98.
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actually recover. The court pointed out that the jury instructions
ensured that the presence of such class members did not affect the
72
size of the verdict.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Tyson’s Arguments
Tyson argues that the employees composing the putative class
were not “similarly situated” and that questions of law or fact
73
common to the class did not predominate over individual questions.
Because the class members wear different combinations of personal
protective equipment that take varying amounts of time to don, doff,
and rinse, Tyson argues that it is impossible for plaintiffs to show, with
common evidence, that they have collectively worked more than forty
74
hours without receiving overtime compensation. Not only do
individual questions predominate, according to Tyson, the lower
courts also erred in allowing statistical sampling to demonstrate
75
plaintiffs’ class-wide liability and damages. Tyson vigorously attacks
plaintiffs’ use of the average donning/doffing times, emphasizing that
“[n]o court would allow an individual employee to prove that he
worked unpaid overtime by submitting evidence of the amount of
time worked by other employees who did different activities that took
76
a different amount of time to perform.”
Tyson interprets the Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co. to hold “only that an employee carried his
burden of proving entitlement to damages under the FLSA ‘if he
proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was
improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to
show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and
77
reasonable inference.’” In other words, Tyson argues that Mt.
Clemens is relevant only after an employee has demonstrated by
individualized evidence that he performed uncompensated overtime
work. Therefore, the case should not be read to allow plaintiffs’ use of
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 18.
74. Id. at 19.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 19–20 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687).
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statistical evidence to estimate the amount of injury the class
collectively suffered.
Tyson raises the inclusion of hundreds of uninjured class members
in the class as another independent ground for reversing the decision
below because such inclusion deprives the class of Article III
78
standing. Tyson introduces a new test to determine if plaintiffs have
constitutional and statutory standing: plaintiffs must show “(1) that
they can prove with common evidence that all class members were
injured, or (2) that there is a mechanism for identifying the uninjured
class members and ensuring that they do not contribute to the size of
79
the damages award and cannot recover damages.” If plaintiffs fail to
meet either requirement prior to certification, Tyson argues, common
80
issues cannot predominate and the class cannot be certified. Even
after the class is certified, Tyson suggests, the court may reconsider the
certification decision “if it later appears that plaintiffs’ proof is
insufficient to establish classwide injury or the culling mechanism is
81
unworkable or inadequate.”
B. Bouaphakeo’s Arguments
Bouaphakeo and the rest of the class rely heavily on the Supreme
Court’s Mt. Clemens ruling to support a conclusion that common
82
questions predominate. First, the class identifies four common
contentions about whether their work was compensable under federal
and state wage-and-hour laws and argues that Tyson conceded that
83
those issues would “dominate” the litigation. Second, four of the five
questions on the verdict form were compensability issues that are
84
common to the class. Thus, the workers argue that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that issues regarding the
85
compensability of their work predominated. They argue that the
only issue that is individualized—the actual number of hours the class
members spent on compensable activities—would have been easy to

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
See id.
Id.
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id.
See id.
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resolve had Tyson kept proper records of those hours as required by
86
both the FLSA and Iowa law.
Per Mt. Clemens, the workers argue that Tyson’s failure to fulfill
its statutory recordkeeping duties permits them to “demonstrate the
‘appropriate’ time worked ‘as a matter of just and reasonable
87
inference.’” The class rejects Tyson’s argument that the Mt. Clemens
88
rule is limited to determining the amount of damages. Rather, “Mt.
Clemens’ core holding,” according to the class, is that “where the
defendant has deprived workers of accurate records . . . [w]orkers may
satisfy their evidentiary burden through reasonable approximation
89
under an objective, classwide standard.” Furthermore, the class
points out that the Mt. Clemens evidentiary standard is a substantive
rule and therefore the district court, by applying the rule to justify
certification, did not violate the Rules Enabling Act and the Due
90
Process Clause as Tyson claims.
The class factually distinguishes this case from Wal-Mart v. Dukes
and argues that the statistical approach employed here is not the
“trial by formula” that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in
91
Dukes. While Dukes involved a myriad of discretionary decisions for
which proof by statistical methods was inappropriate, the plaintiffs
here are “subjected to a common, plant-wide policy that
92
systematically undercompensated them.”
Lastly, the class argues that Tyson lacks standing to appeal the
district court’s lump-sum damages award both because Tyson itself
invited the error by insisting on an aggregated verdict and because
93
the allocation of the verdict does not change Tyson’s liability. The
jury instruction also ensured that uninjured class members would not
94
receive any damages award.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id.
Id. at 24 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946)).
Id. at 24, 43–44.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 25.
See id. at 25, 50.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 26, 57–58.
Id. at 26, 59.
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VI. ANALYSIS: MT. CLEMENS GOVERNS THE SUBSTANTIVE
EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
Under Rule 23(b)(3) a class may be certified if common questions
predominate over individual ones and a class action is superior to
95
other methods of resolving a dispute. Because predominance
96
requires the plaintiffs to establish “classwide proof,” whether this
requirement is satisfied depends on the substantive law governing the
97
plaintiffs’ claims. The FLSA collective action requirement is less
stringent, as it only requires employees joining an action to be
“similarly situated” and does not require common questions to
98
predominate over individual ones.
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. allows employees to rely on
inferences drawn from representative proof to “show the amount and
99
extent” of their overtime work on a class-wide basis. In Tyson Foods,
Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, Tyson’s violation of its recordkeeping duty under
the FLSA triggers the evidentiary standard the Supreme Court
established in Mt. Clemens.
Despite its recent rejection of “trial by formula” in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, the Court should allow the plaintiffs in Tyson Foods to use
statistical evidence in light of Mt. Clemens. Because of Mt. Clemens’
clear precedential authority in this case, the Court should decide this
case narrowly, without addressing the stringency of class certification
requirements in general.
This case requires the Court to decide between two conflicting
interpretations of Mt. Clemens: whether it governs the determination
of both liability and damages or whether it applies only when
“damage is . . . certain” and the “uncertainty lies only in the amount of
100
damages.” Because of the impracticality of proving liability and
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
96. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013).
97. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011)
(“Considering whether ‘questions of law or fact common to class members predominate’ begins
. . . with the elements of the underlying cause of action.”); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct.
1426, 1432 (2013) (stating that the predominance inquiry “generally involves considerations that
are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff ‘s cause of action”) (citation
omitted).
98. Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart
Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 536 (2012); Brian R.
Gates, A “Less Stringent” Standard? How to Give FLSA Section 16(b) A Life of Its Own, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1553 (2005).
99. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946).
100. Id. at 688.
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damages separately in this case, the Court should adopt the former
reading of Mt. Clemens.
The question, therefore, is what prerequisites must be met for the
Mt. Clemens rule to apply. Tyson wants the plaintiffs to prove that
individual class member’s work exceeds the forty-hour overtime
threshold before representative evidence can be introduced to
101
determine how much overtime the plaintiffs are owed. As the
plaintiffs point out, however, “where the ‘liability’ question is simply
whether an employee suffered any damages,” the distinction between
102
liability and damages is “untenable.” Here, proving one will
necessarily prove the other because the amount of uncompensated
work the plaintiffs performed is the only fact governing both liability
103
and damages. Therefore, it is nonsensical to require the plaintiffs to
establish liability before they can use “just and reasonable inference”
to establish the amount of damages.
Additionally, such a requirement would defeat the central purpose
of the Mt. Clemens decision, which is to relieve the employees of an
unreasonable evidentiary burden when the employer fails to meet its
104
recordkeeping duty. Hence, the reading of Mt. Clemens to both
liability and damages most accurately captures the Court’s intent at
the time.
Because Mt. Clemens applies to this case, the plaintiffs’ use of
statistical evidence is proper. Tyson argues that the use of statistical
averages to estimate the liability and damages of the class constitutes
“trial by formula,” which was explicitly rejected by the Court in
105
Dukes. Tyson is both misinterpreting the term and baselessly
stretching the application of Dukes.
In Dukes, the Court used “trial by formula” to describe a process
“where liability and damages would be determined for a sample of
class members” and “[t]he percentage of claims determined to be
valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the
number of (presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be
multiplied by the average backpay award in the same set to arrive at
the entire class recovery—without further individualized

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 39.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 43.
Id.
Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687.
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 39.
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proceedings.” Unlike in Dukes, however, where the plaintiffs only
proved liability for a sample set of class members, the plaintiffs in this
case proved liability for every class member by calculating the
amount of time each member worked “[u]sing ‘time sheets’ and ‘[p]ay
107
data’ obtained ‘directly from [Tyson].’”
Additionally, Dukes is factually dissimilar to this case, so it has
108
little precedential value here. Unlike Dukes, which involved many
discretionary decisions, this case involves employees working at the
same plant, using similar equipment, and who are subjected to the
same company policy that “systematically undercompensated them
109
for compensable work under the FLSA and state law.” Hence,
Tyson’s attempt to use the Dukes decision to undermine the Mt.
Clemens rule here fails.
Similarly, Tyson’s argument that variations in the time the
plaintiffs spent donning and doffing the different equipment
“rendered [their] evidence insufficient for the jury to draw a
reasonable inference of the extent of class members’ uncompensated
110
work” also fails. First, whether the differences among class members
are so great as to warrant decertification is a factual inquiry for the
jury to decide. Here, the jury returned a verdict for the class, which
suggests that it found the class members to be sufficiently similar to
permit reasonable inferences based on the plaintiffs’ representative
evidence. Tyson cannot ask the Court to overturn the jury’s factual
determination without providing the Court with sufficient
justification to do so.
Second, because variations almost always exist among class
members, adopting Tyson’s standard would mean that virtually no
class action could be certified. There is no limiting principle in Tyson’s
standard to prevent it from requiring “classwide evidence to capture
111
every minuscule variation in workers’ time.” In fact, the Court
openly rejected a similarly stringent standard of proof that the Sixth

106. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
107. Brief for the United States, supra note 22, at 20.
108. See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 797–98 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting the
factual dissimilarity between the two cases).
109. Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 50; see Bouaphakeo, 765 F.3d at 798–799.
110. Brief for the United States, supra note 22, at 23.
111. Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 42.
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Circuit Court of Appeals demanded in Mt. Clemens. Therefore, at
least in circumstances where an employer has clearly violated its
statutory duty to keep proper records, the employees should be
subject to a more lenient standard and be able to use statistical
evidence to prove their injury.
CONCLUSION
Because of the clear evidentiary standard laid out in Anderson v.
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., the Supreme Court should allow the use of
statistical evidence as common proof satisfying class certification
requirements, at least in cases where the employer has clearly violated
its FLSA recordkeeping duty. Nevertheless, given its ruling in WalMart v. Dukes, the Court may be less willing to allow such
representative evidence to prove class-wide liability and damages
under other circumstances. The future of class actions remains grim,
but the plaintiffs in this case should prevail.

112. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–87 (1946) (rejecting the
Sixth Circuit’s argument that it is insufficient for the employees to prove their case with an
estimated average of overtime worked).

